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“war on terror,” with any reassessment incorporating the threat posed by al
Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Some modest analysis suggests that
terrorism remains a miniscule risk for the average American, and it hardly
poses an existential threat to the United States. Nonetheless, terrorismrelated fears have distorted the people’s risk perception and facilitated
dubious public policies, exemplified here by a series of programs
implemented by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Among
other things, this agency has adopted costly technology and intrusive pat
downs to screen airline passengers with little evidence that the terrorist risk
has been meaningfully and efficiently reduced as a result. The TSA regime
also clashes with core constitutional values and decent understandings of
the Fourth Amendment. To date, however, the courts have been deferential
to the government. Although the decisions rehearse established exceptions,
they are indicative of an entirely new constitutional exception grounded in
irrational fears of terrorism.
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INTRODUCTION
On the evening of May 1, 2011, the American people learned that the
world’s most wanted criminal—Osama bin Laden—had been killed in
Pakistan during a covert operation by an elite U.S. military team.1 The news
triggered spontaneous gatherings and revelry across the country. For the
millennium’s new generation, bin Laden had been the embodiment of evil,
an omnipresent bogeyman, and, for some, “the first person I was ever
taught to hate.”2 Many young Americans will not be able to recall life
without a deep-seated fear of the terrorist leader and the organization he
founded,3 all against a national backdrop of the so-called “war on terror.”
Bin Laden’s death thus signaled the “end of an era” and progress “toward a
safer, less violent world.”4
After emotions settled, however, thoughts turned to the ultimate impact
of the operation that closed “the Bin Laden decade.”5 The al Qaeda leader
“really did a number on all of us,” wrote New York Times columnist
Thomas Friedman.6 “Who will tell the people how deep the hole is that Bin
Laden helped each of us dig over the last decade—and who will tell the
people how hard and how necessary it will be to climb out?”7 The question
appears ripe in light of statements made by top officials. Defense Secretary
1

See, e.g., Peter Baker, Helene Cooper & Mark Mazzetti, Bin Laden Is Dead, Obama Says, N.Y.
TIMES (May 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-killed.html?
pagewanted=1.
2
Ann O’Neill, The 9/11 Generation’s Bogeyman Is Gone, CNN (May 5, 2011, 7:08 AM), http://
www.cnn.com/2011/LIVING/05/04/bin.laden.911.generation.react/index.html.
3
Established by bin Laden in the late 1980s, al Qaeda (“the base”) has served as an umbrella
organization and virtual clearinghouse for Islamist terrorism aimed at Western nations and perceived
apostate governments in the Middle East. Over the years, bin Laden and his henchmen would work with
various organizations (e.g., Ansar al Islam) and direct “franchises” of al Qaeda (e.g., al Qaeda in Iraq).
4
O’Neill, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5
Thomas L. Friedman, The Bin Laden Decade, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/06/01/opinion/01friedman.html?; Michael Hastings, My Decade of Bin Laden, ROLLING
STONE (May 8, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/my-decade-of-bin-laden20110508.
6
Friedman, supra note 5.
7
Id.
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Leon Panetta claimed that the United States was “within reach of
strategically defeating Al Qaeda.”8 Shortly thereafter, President Barack
Obama announced that “Al Qaeda is under more pressure than at any time
since 9/11” and that “more than half of al Qaeda’s leadership” had been
taken out.9
The time has come for a postmortem examination, so to speak, of the
damage wrought during the decade of bin Laden. Some, like Friedman,
have looked to the international consequences, including the perpetually
troubled relationship among Israel, Muslim-majority nations, and the
United States, which was undoubtedly worsened by 9/11 and its aftershock.
This Essay contemplates an area of domestic concern that represents
perhaps the most palpable effect of terrorism on the American citizenry:
travel by plane. In an insightful piece, Professor Alexander Reinert analyzes
Fourth Amendment doctrine as applied to airport security.10 Here, I hope to
complement this work by offering some context on terrorism, with the goal
of prompting discussion as to whether bin Laden’s legacy will include yet
another instance of constitutional exceptionalism.
By definition, exceptionalism is a comparative concept involving a
contrast among sufficiently analogous sets of values and practices, where an
apparent anomaly or special case is subject to descriptive and normative
assessments.11 For example, the idea of drug exceptionalism is premised
upon the unique history and policy of prohibition and, in particular, the
extraordinary treatment of drug crime by legislatures, law enforcement, and
the courts.12 The result is a sort of “drug exception” to the Constitution,
where otherwise applicable constitutional rules do not seem to apply (or are
watered down) in the government’s pursuit of contraband.13 Since 9/11,
however, the exceptionalism of America’s “war on drugs” has been outdone
by the “war on terror.”
The very use of the term “war” in this context signifies the
extraordinary nature of government efforts, providing a state-sponsored
metaphor to emphasize the seriousness of the threat and the virtue of

8

Elisabeth Bumiller, Panetta Says Defeat of Al Qaeda Is “Within Reach,” N.Y. TIMES, (July 9,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/world/asia/10military.html?scp=1&sq=bumiller%20panetta
%20says%20defeat%20of%20al%20qaeda%20is%20within%20reach&st=cse (internal quotation mark
omitted).
9
Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President on the Way
Forward in Afghanistan (June 22, 2011), available at http://m.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/
22/remarks-president-way-forward-afghanistan.
10
Alexander A. Reinert, Revisiting “Special Needs” Theory Via Airport Searches, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 207 (2012).
11
See, e.g., Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 753–54 (2002).
12
See, e.g., id.
13
See id. at 757–68.

1491

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

official actions.14 At times, the United States has been too heavy-handed—
and occasionally ham-handed as well—in its approach to fighting terrorism,
with important consequences for fundamental rights. The government has
engaged in, inter alia: ethnic profiling and related abuses; extended,
incommunicado detention and secret proceedings in immigration cases;
“enhanced interrogation techniques” (a.k.a. torture) such as water-boarding;
extraordinary rendition of detainees to foreign nations known for human
rights abuses; mass wiretapping and data collection by the National
Security Agency; the maintenance of a quasi-penal colony in Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba; and extrajudicial targeted killings abroad, even of U.S.
citizens.15
The full extent of government operations in the aftermath of 9/11 may
never be known, especially since America’s antiterrorism and
counterterrorism16 efforts are shrouded in secrecy, with Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) requests and civil rights suits thwarted by official
invocations of privilege over state secrets and matters of national security.17
The government justified new policies on the basis of necessity, and the
American public largely accepted this at face value.18 In terms of economic
costs, the past decade has occasioned a trillion-dollar increase in
expenditures on homeland security alone.19 Bin Laden’s death thus provides
an auspicious moment for a levelheaded assessment of the government’s
extraordinary actions in view of the threat posed by terrorism.

14

Of course, the “war on terror” has involved nonmetaphorical, conventional warfare in
Afghanistan and Iraq, which, in many ways, outstrips all other developments.
15
See, e.g., WAYNE MCCORMACK, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TERRORISM 360–68 (2007); Erik
Luna, Criminal Justice and the Public Imagination, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 105–09 (2009); Mark
Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-iskilled-in-yemen.html?pagewanted=all.
16
Antiterrorism is defined as “[d]efensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals
and property to terrorist acts,” while counterterrorism is defined as “[a]ctions taken directly against
terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable
to terrorist networks.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 20, 76
(2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
17
See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302–13 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing a lawsuit
regarding an “extraordinary rendition” program because of the state secrets privilege (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(denying a FOIA request from public interest groups seeking information about detainees in wake of
9/11).
18
See Luna, supra note 15, at 109–10.
19
See John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Does the United States Spend Too Much on Homeland
Security?, SLATE.COM (Sept. 7, 2011, 12:10 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
politics/2011/09/does_the_united_states_spend_too_much_on_homeland_security.html.
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I. TERRORISM AND RISK ANALYSIS
Of principal concern here is the true nature of the danger to the United
States: Is the menace of terrorism existential, as many government officials
have alleged, threatening the nation’s very existence or at least jeopardizing
the American way of life as we know it?20 If so, one could rationalize
otherwise forbidden actions as a means of domestic self-preservation,
consistent with the axiom that the Constitution is not a suicide pact.21 But if
terrorism presents an unexceptional risk in terms of death and destruction,
one would be hard pressed to justify wholesale deviations from
constitutional principles—that is, unless the national compact binds weakly
or not at all.
This analysis is enlightened by the tools of risk assessment, created by
experts to evaluate assorted dangers to human life—from industrial
accidents to nuclear power—by considering the likelihood and
consequences of a given threat and comparing it to standard benchmarks.
Based on the regulatory guidelines in various developed nations, there
seems to be some agreement that a risk is unacceptable—and therefore may
necessitate government action—if the annual fatality rate is greater than 1
in 10,000 or, in some cases, 1 in 100,000.22 A risk is acceptable—requiring
no further safety improvements—if the annual fatality rate is 1 in 1,000,000
(or sometimes 1 in 2,000,000).23
In a series of works, political scientist John Mueller and civil engineer
Mark Stewart have applied risk assessment techniques to terrorism-related

20

See, e.g., Luna, supra note 15, at 118–21; Jan Freeman, Existentially Speaking, BOSTON GLOBE
(Feb. 4, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2007/02/04/existentially_speaking;
John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Hardly Existential: Thinking Rationally About Terrorism, FOREIGN
AFF. (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66186/john-mueller-and-mark-g-stewart/
hardly-existential?page=show; William Safire, Existential, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2007), http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/04/08/magazine/08wwlnsafire.t.html.
21
Cf. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“There is
danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will
convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”). To be clear, this position is not being
adopted here.
22
See, e.g., Mueller & Stewart, supra note 20.
23
See, e.g., id. (“Between these two ranges [i.e., acceptable and unacceptable risks] is an area in
which risk might be considered ‘tolerable.’”). To be sure, these thresholds are not “magical” but are
instead the result of America’s mesh of legislation, litigation, and administrative rulemaking, as well as
the policy decisions of other nations. See, e.g., Tim Bedford, As Low as Reasonably Practicable/As Low
as Reasonably Achievable, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT 38
(Edward L. Melnick & Brian S. Everitt eds., 2008) (describing the “as low as reasonably practicable”
(ALARP) principle and its application in the United Kingdom); John D. Graham, The Legacy of One in
a Million, RISK IN PERSP. (Harvard Ctr. for Risk Analysis, Cambridge, Mass.), Mar. 1993 (detailing
history of “1 in 1,000,000” as a standard for de minimis risk).
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issues,24 including whether the threat of terrorism is, in fact, existential. For
instance, in the United States, the dangers of cancer (1 in 540) and traffic
accidents (1 in 8000) are within the unacceptable range of 1 in 10,000. By
contrast, the annual fatality risk of modern terrorism is 1 in 3,500,000,
making it a lesser threat than deer hunting accidents, home appliance
malfunctions, or bathtub drownings.25 To fall within the unacceptable range,
the number of terrorist-related fatalities would have to increase
exponentially, with America “experiencing attacks on the scale of 9/11 once
a year, or 18 Oklahoma City bombings every year.”26 For these and other
reasons, the authors concluded that terrorism is hardly an existential threat
that would justify costly government actions to further reduce the risk.
The analysis applies with full force to the realistic threats to domestic
security posed by al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, which largely
involve bombings and shootings using conventional weapons.27 Even
though these acts are undoubtedly appalling, they can be classified as lethal
but not altogether extraordinary crimes. Certainly, they are not dangers to
America’s existence on par with a military invasion or an internal
insurrection.28 As for the presumably apocalyptic threat of a nuclear attack,
the key question is one of likelihood. While it is not inconceivable that al
Qaeda could obtain a nuclear weapon, several reports have concluded that
the odds remain quite low due to, among other things, the difficulty of
acquiring the necessary materials.29 Even if the risk of nuclear attack were

24

See, e.g., JOHN MUELLER & MARK G. STEWART, TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING
Mueller & Stewart, supra note 20.
25
See Mueller & Stewart, supra note 20.
26
Id.
27
NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM,
BACKGROUND REPORT: 9/11, TEN YEARS LATER 3 (2011), available at http://www.start.umd.edu/start/
announcements/BackgroundReport_10YearsSince9_11.pdf.
28
See Luna, supra note 15, at 134–36.
29
See FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF THE ADVISORY PANEL
TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION 21 (2002), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/nsrd/
terrpanel/terror4.pdf; NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: A TRANSFORMED WORLD
61–62 (2008), available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf;
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., HOMELAND SECURITY THREAT ASSESSMENT: EVALUATING THREATS
2008–2013, at 5–6 (2008), available at http://publicintelligence.info/DHS-Threats2008-2013.pdf; see
also DANIEL GARDNER, THE SCIENCE OF FEAR 252–58 (2008) (questioning the likelihood of terrorists
obtaining weapons of mass destruction); JOHN MUELLER, ATOMIC OBSESSION: NUCLEAR ALARMISM
FROM HIROSHIMA TO AL-QAEDA (2010) (challenging the alleged threat of nuclear annihilation and, in
particular, the prospect of terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons). But see ROLF MOWATT-LARSSEN, AL
QAEDA WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREAT: HYPE OR REALITY? 7 (2010), available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf.
THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2011);
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viable, the appropriate policy stance would be to focus government efforts
on that particular threat, not on all forms of terrorism.30
This understanding can help inform the topic of this Essay—the impact
of terrorism on commercial air travel. In the wake of 9/11, one scholar
calculated the risk to individual fliers:
[L]et us assume that each week one commercial aircraft were hijacked and
crashed. What are the odds that a person who goes on one trip per month
would be in that plane? There are currently about 18,000 commercial flights a
day, and if that person’s trip has four flights associated with it, the odds against
that person’s being on a crashed plane are about 135,000 to 1. If there were
only one hijacked plane per month, the odds would be about 540,000 to 1.31

Even under these hyperbolic conditions, the theoretical risk to the
individual flier is still just a fraction of the actual risk to the individual
driver. The nation’s failure to appreciate the relative risks—what Cass
Sunstein calls “probability neglect”32—can have perverse consequences.
One study estimated that around 1500 people died in the year after 9/11
because Americans moved from the safest form of travel (flying) to the
most dangerous (driving) in order to avoid the fate of those who perished
during the terrorist attacks.33 A later study questioned these findings, only to
offer another disturbing sequence of events: Instead of additional road
miles, the increased fatalities resulted from heightened stress among people
living in the Northeast, proximate to the site of the attacks, who used and
abused drugs and alcohol at a higher rate after 9/11, thereby affecting road
safety.34 Either way, Americans were acting contrary to their individual and
collective interests.
30

See, e.g., Jeffrey Goldberg & Marc Ambinder, The Ally from Hell, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/the-ally-from-hell/8730 (reporting on questions
about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal).
31
Michael L. Rothschild, Terrorism and You—The Real Odds, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2001, at B7;
see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 97 (2005) (“[I]f
it is estimated that the United States will suffer at least one terrorist attack each year with the same
number of deaths as on September 11, the risk of death from terrorism is about .001 percent . . . .”).
32
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 65–88 (describing “probability neglect”); see also DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 137–45 (2011) (discussing phenomena more generally).
33
See Gerd Gigerenzer, Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire: Behavioral Reactions to Terrorist
Attacks, 26 RISK ANALYSIS 347, 350 (2006); see also GARDNER, supra note 29, at 3; Garrick Blalock,
Vrinda Kadiyali & Daniel H. Simon, Driving Fatalities After 9/11: A Hidden Cost of Terrorism,
41 APPLIED ECON. 1717, 1726 (2009) (estimating that about 2300 lives were lost because of travelers’
response to 9/11).
34
See Jenny C. Su et al., Driving Under the Influence (of Stress): Evidence of a Regional Increase
in Impaired Driving and Traffic Fatalities After the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI.
59, 64 (2009); see also infra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing reduction in demand for shorthaul flights). Another example of perverse collective public behavior in response to fears of terrorism
was the use of prescription antibiotics to treat anthrax (e.g., ciprofloxacin), which was unnecessary and
even harmful due to adverse reactions and increased antibiotic resistance. See, e.g., U.S. Food & Drug
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Of course, people are not always rational, as the term is understood in
the classical microeconomic model.35 Fear and other intensely negative
emotions can sway public policy by distorting people’s perception of risk
and evaluation of potential responses.36 In particular, low-probability events
perceived as catastrophic, uncontrollable, and distributively inequitable—a
so-called “dread risk,”37 such as the danger associated with nuclear power—
engender higher levels of fear than threats that are, in truth, more likely and
more lethal. Humans typically assess risks based on mental associations
mediated by the heuristic of availability, and the more horrific the image,
the greater the associated risk. Media coverage can amplify images and
related risk perception, at times fostering mistaken beliefs that a consensus
has been reached on the nature of a threat, the need for action, and the
propriety of the chosen response. Unsurprisingly, political actors have been
inclined to exploit (or at least not question) instances of public
emotionalism out of concern for their own electoral self-interests.
A number of factors—psychological, social, institutional, even
evolutionary38—may contribute to an “availability cascade,” where a
sequence of events transforms the expressed perceptions of individuals into
public panic and political rabble-rousing.39 Recently, Daniel Kahneman
described the implications for terrorism-related issues:
In today’s world, terrorists are the most significant practitioners of the art of
inducing availability cascades. With a few horrible exceptions such as 9/11,
the number of casualties from terror attacks is very small relative to other
causes of death. Even in countries that have been targets of intensive terror
campaigns, such as Israel, the weekly number of casualties almost never came
close to the number of traffic deaths. The difference is in the availability of the
two risks, the ease and the frequency with which they come to mind.
Gruesome images, endlessly repeated in the media, cause everyone to be on
edge.40

Admin., Information on Cipro (Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride) for Inhalation Anthrax for Consumers:
Questions and Answers, FDA.GOV (Nov. 14, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/EmergencyPreparedness/
BioterrorismandDrugPreparedness/ucm130711.htm (“Random prescribing and extensive use of Cipro
could speed up the development of drug-resistant organisms, and the usefulness of Cipro as an antibiotic
may be lost.”).
35
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3–4 (8th ed. 2011).
36
See Luna, supra note 15, at 81–86; Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism,
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 22–28, 32–34 (2010). See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 89–106
(describing social propagation and impact of fear); Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280
(1987) (sketching the study and implications of risk perception).
37
See, e.g., Slovic, supra note 36, at 282–83 (discussing the “dread risk” factor).
38
See Gigerenzer, supra note 33, at 348.
39
See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683, 685 (1999) (describing the concept of availability cascades).
40
KAHNEMAN, supra note 32, at 144.
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The phenomenon tends to undermine sound public policy, understood
as decisionmaking that includes an informed grading of risks and cost–
benefit analysis of possible options, all within the structural limitations of
government and with due respect for individual rights. If nothing else, good
policymaking does not propagate the illusion of enhanced security, nor does
it divert attention and resources from those risks that can be meaningfully
reduced. Instead, it focuses efforts on actually increasing public safety with
some degree of efficiency. In a modern constitutional democracy, sound
policy would also respect the fundamental rights of individuals in
recognition that safeguarding civil liberties is both a principal objective of a
written constitution and in the long-term interests of society.41
Today, public perception of terrorism and the post-9/11 governmental
reaction are prime examples of public policy driven by fear rather than
rational decisionmaking. As both a word and a concept, “terrorism” evokes
intense, tragic images that tend to preclude rational risk assessments based
on the available information.42 The resulting fear is exacerbated by the
stochastic nature of terrorism, the terrorists’ use of indiscriminate lethal
weapons, and their willingness to target civilians who lack meaningful
control over the risk of attack.43 As mentioned above, the federal
government has responded with unprecedented policies and practices, in
terms of the resources expended and the infringements on individual rights.
To be sure, al Qaeda’s threat has not disappeared, as duly noted by
President Obama, his national security team, and prominent foreign
leaders.44 Interpol still considers al Qaeda the world’s biggest terrorist
security threat, with direct affiliates and allied groups spread across the
globe. Not so long ago, London was reported as a possible target for a
“dirty bomb” (i.e., a conventional explosive mixed with radioactive
material).45 On this side of the Atlantic, national security experts and law
enforcement officials warned of an attack in the United States on or around
the ten-year anniversary of 9/11. Thankfully, these threats never
materialized. Yet even if they had, this would still not justify perforce the
suspension of individual rights and the implementation of an antiliberal
41

See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); F.A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960).
42
SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 40.
43
See Ben Sheppard, Mitigating Terror and Avoidance Behavior Through the Risk Perception
Matrix to Augment Resilience, 8 J. HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY MGMT. 1, 3–4 (2011).
44
See, e.g., Prime Minister David Cameron, Statement to the House of Commons on the Death of
Osama Bin Laden and Wider Counter-Terrorism Issues (May 3, 2011), available at http://www.fco.gov.
uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=PressS&id=591331982.
45
Duncan Gardham, Nuclear Terror Risk to Britain from al-Qaeda, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 22, 2010,
10:20 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/7500719/Nuclear-terror-riskto-Britain-from-al-Qaeda.html; Interpol Says al Qaeda Remains Biggest Global Threat, REUTERS CAN.
(June 7, 2011, 12:31 AM), http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE7560RE20110607.
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program of state surveillance and control. Again, the critical issues for risk
analysis are those of scale and probability, which affect any meaningful
assessment of costs and benefits and thus sound policymaking.46
While al Qaeda undoubtedly remains a menace, it has been weakened
in recent times and does not present an existential threat to the United
States.47 The Obama Administration seemed to admit as much in its
guidelines on commemorating the ten-year anniversary of 9/11: Although
terrorists “still have the ability to inflict harm, . . . Al Qaeda and its
adherents have become increasingly irrelevant.”48 Since 9/11, the capture or
killing of key figures in al Qaeda operations—including, of course, bin
Laden himself—has substantially downsized the threat posed by the
organization.49 Al Qaeda is thus a fundamentalist group in decline, still bent
on wreaking havoc and using fear as a political tool, but incapable of
achieving its goals,50 at least directly. Instead, the real “existential” threat to

46

But cf. William A. Niskanen, Benefit/Cost Analysis in the Balance, 19 REGULATION 65, 65–66
(1996) (reviewing RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996) and agreeing with one
contributor’s bottom line: “The time has come to purge the utilitarian foundation from benefit/cost
analysis. This means identifying the tool as a decision analysis rather than a means for prescribing
optimal decisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
47
Perhaps al Qaeda never was, nor could be, an existential threat. See, e.g., Gene Healy, Al Qaeda
Was Never an “Existential Threat,” WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 12, 2011, 8:05 PM), http://
washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columnists/2011/09/al-qaeda-was-never-existential-threat; Glenn L.
Carle, Overstating Our Fears, WASH. POST (July 13, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/07/11/AR2008071102710.html.
48
Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt, White House Issues Guides on Sept. 11 Observances, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/us/politics/30terror.html?pagewanted=all
(internal quotation marks omitted).
49
See, e.g., Alison Fitzgerald, Bin Laden Death Means Most Sept. 11 Terror Conspirators Killed or
Captured, BLOOMBERG (May 3, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-04/binladen-death-means-most-sept-11-terror-conspirators-killed-or-captured.html; Agence France-Presse, AlQaeda Leaders Who Have Been Killed or Captured, ABS-CBN NEWS (May 2, 2011, 9:37 PM),
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/05/02/11/al-qaeda-leaders-who-have-been-killed-orcaptured; Tom A. Peter, Killing of Al Qaeda’s No. 2 a Hammer Blow to Weakening Group, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 28, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2011/0828/Killingof-Al-Qaeda-s-No.-2-a-hammer-blow-to-weakening-group-VIDEO.
50
See, e.g., HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT, HUMAN SECURITY BRIEF 2007, at 5 (2008),
available at http://www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSB2007/2007HumanSecurityBrief-FullText.
pdf; BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, STRAY DOGS AND VIRTUAL ARMIES: RADICALIZATION AND
RECRUITMENT TO JIHADIST TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 9/11, at 1 (2011), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP343.pdf (“[D]espite al Qaeda’s intensive
online recruiting campaign [for homegrown jihadists], their numbers remain small, their determination
limp, and their competence poor.”); NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 69–70
(concluding that al Qaeda may “decay sooner than many people think” and “support for terrorist
networks in the Muslim world appears to be declining”); Scott Shane, Rethinking Our Terrorist Fears,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/weekinreview/27shane.html?
pagewanted=all (noting that terrorism experts believe al Qaeda and its jihadist agenda are in decline in
the Muslim world).
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the United States—the one that endangers the American way of life and the
nation’s particular form of constitutional governance—is not al Qaeda
itself, but the political reactions to al Qaeda that trade fundamental liberties
for the pretense of greater security.
II. THE TSA REGIME
Turning again to the topic of airport security, the search-and-seizure
regime adopted by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)51
provides a poignant example of irrational policy responses to improbable
future terrorist attacks. As an initial matter, many experts anticipate that the
next organized plot against America will involve something other than
commercial aircraft, such as coordinated bombings in public places.52 For
the sake of argument, though, let us assume that al Qaeda still seeks to use
its single most successful modus operandi—keeping in mind that 9/11
could and should have been prevented by government officials (i.e., it was
not inevitable under the then-existing legal regime53), and that the TSA’s
actions could, at best, merely decrease the likelihood of an already minute
chance of another 9/11-type event.
The question is whether the threat of aircraft terrorism and the
presumed risk reduction justify the TSA regime and its infringement upon
individual rights. The most controversial development within this regime
has been described by one policy expert as a “strip/grope” procedure.54 It
begins with the TSA’s use of “Advanced Imaging Technology” (AIT),
which is supposed to screen for both metallic and nonmetallic threats such
as explosives and other weapons. But as passengers pass through a booth
that uses either millimeter wave or backscatter technology, far more is
revealed than guns and bombs.55 These “porno scans” or “strip-search
51

Little more than a month after 9/11, Congress established the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), which assumed responsibility for civil aviation security previously held by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 10771, § 101, 115 Stat. 597, 597-604 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 114). Although the TSA was originally
part of the U.S. Department of Transportation, it was relocated within the newly established Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, § 403, 116 Stat.
2135, 2178 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 203).
52
Cf. John Arquilla, The Coming Swarm, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/02/15/opinion/15arquilla.html?scp=1&sq=John%20Arquilla%20The%20Coming%20Swarm&st=
cse (describing the emergence of “a new ‘Mumbai model’ of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist
violence”).
53
See Luna, supra note 15, at 115.
54
Jim Harper, Legislation to Protect the Rights of Travelers, CATO INST. (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12924 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55
For what it is worth, here are pictures provided by the government as to “what TSA sees”:
http://www.tsa.gov/graphics/images/approach/mmw_large.jpg
(millimeter
wave
technology);
http://www.tsa.gov/graphics/images/approach/backscatter_large.jpg (backscatter technology). Far racier
images are available on the Internet.
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machines,” as critics have labeled them, create full body images of
passengers.56
Some travelers may have no problem with their bodies being exposed
in this manner (might exhibitionists and flashers even enjoy it?).57 However,
heavy criticism from across society suggests that many people object to the
computer-generated outlines of their naked physiques, which detail breasts,
buttocks, genitals, and other curves and crevices.58 These are the precise
body parts that one intentionally covers for reasons of personal privacy,
social etiquette, and, not least of all, criminal liability for indecent exposure.
In an earlier era, these types of pictures might have been held obscene under
First Amendment doctrine; today, the images are part of the TSA’s
imposition on travelers, giving a new meaning to the term “federal
mandate.”
The technology is coupled with enhanced frisks that might be hard to
differentiate from an assaultive grope. Professor Reinert notes several
reported abuses, like a sixty-one-year-old bladder cancer survivor who was
subjected to such a violent frisk that his urostomy bag broke, leaving him
covered in his own urine.59 Other troubling stories include an eight-monthold baby frisked by TSA agents and a ninety-five-year-old woman who was
forced to remove her adult diaper.60 Some have claimed that TSA agents
employ enhanced frisks in a punitive fashion, reserving them for individuals
who object to being scanned by the new imaging machines.61 Indeed, the
56

See Harper, supra note 54; Andrew Kreig, Terror and the TSA, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20,
2010, 5:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-kreig/terror-tsa_b_786434.html.
57
But see infra note 87 (discussing naked protests).
58
Apparently, the imaging technology can also detect a woman’s sanitary napkin. Joe Sharkey,
Screening Protests Grow as Holiday Crunch Looms, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/11/16/business/16road.html?_r=1&sq=sharkey.
59
Reinert, supra note 10, at 211. Similar stories involve mistreatment of breast cancer survivors.
See, e.g., Breast Cancer Survivor Lori Dorn Says She Endured “Humiliating” Pat-Down at JFK, CBS
NEW YORK (Oct. 4, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/10/04/breast-cancer-survivorlori-dorn-says-she-endured-humiliating-patdown-at-jfk; Brad Hyatt & Molly Grantham, After Removing
Prosthetic Breast, Flight Attendant Says TSA Goes “Too Far,” WBTV 3 NEWS (Dec. 10, 2010, 11:19
PM), http://www.wbtv.com/Global/story.asp?S=13534628.
60
Joy Jernigan, Baby Receives Pat-Down at Kansas City Airport, MSNBC (May 11, 2011, 9:59
AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42978267/ns/travel-news/t/baby-receives-pat-down-kansas-cityairport; TSA Stands by Officers After Pat-Down of Elderly Woman in Florida, CNN (June 26, 2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-26/us/florida.tsa.incident_1_pat-down-tsa-pat-downs-tsa-officer?_s=
PM:US. After initially claiming that “screening procedures were followed,” TSA officials apologized
for strip searches of two ailing, elderly women at JFK International Airport. Rich Schapiro, TSA Admits
Strip Search Screwup, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-0118/news/30641168_1_tsa-agent-screeners-markey (internal quotation marks omitted).
61
Charlie Leocha, TSA Admits to Punishing Travelers, CONSUMER TRAVELER (Aug. 24, 2010),
http://www.consumertraveler.com/today/tsa-admits-to-punishing-travelers. As an aside, the TSA
detained U.S. Senator Rand Paul for two hours after he set off a scanner alarm and refused a full body
pat-down. See, e.g., Matthew Boyle, Rand Paul on TSA Detainment: “I Was Barked at, ‘Do Not Leave
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TSA appears to encourage heavier scrutiny of those who dispute the
agency’s authority.
Pursuant to the behavior detection program known as SPOT (Screening
Passengers by Observation Technique), TSA agents are instructed to look
for “behavioral indicators” of stress, fear, or deception.62 Of the seventy
indicators, perhaps the most vexing and legally questionable basis for
enhanced scrutiny is when the passenger is “[v]ery arrogant and expresses
contempt against airport passenger procedures.”63 If nothing else, this could
induce complaisance among passengers who may submit when faced with
questionable TSA conduct in hopes of avoiding more intense inspections or
just to get the whole thing over with. Allegations of racial discrimination
have dogged the SPOT program as well,64 including claims that the program
“has become a magnet for racial profiling, targeting not only Middle
Easterners but also blacks, Hispanics and other minorities.”65
Given the foregoing, an authoritarian strip-or-grope procedure is hard
to justify, keeping in mind that the appropriate baseline is not a securityless,

the Cubicle!’,” DAILY CALLER (Jan. 23, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2012/01/23/rand-paulon-tsa-detainment-i-was-barked-at-do-not-leave-the-cubicle. In theory, at least, Senator Paul’s detention
could have violated the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
62
Mike M. Ahlers & Jeanne Meserve, TSA Security Looks at People Who Complain About . . . TSA
Security, CNN (Apr. 15, 2011, 12:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TRAVEL/04/15/tsa.screeners.
complain/index.html?iref=allsearch.
63
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For all the flying public knows, criticism of TSA agents
could result in one’s inclusion on the federal government’s “no-fly list,” which would lead to delays and
even detention during subsequent journeys through airport security. As outlandish as this seems, it must
be remembered that the no-fly list doubled in size over the past year, with about 1000 changes made to
the government’s watch list each day. Eileen Sullivan, U.S. No-Fly List Doubles in One Year,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2012, 4:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/02/no-fly-listdoubles_n_1249014.html. Compare Peter Eisler, Terrorist Watch List Hits 1 Million, USA TODAY (Mar.
10, 2009, 11:06 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-03-10-watchlist_N.htm
(reporting that the watch list had grown to one million names), with Myth Buster: TSA’s Watch List Is
More than One Million People Strong, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/approach/
mythbusters/tsa_watch_list.shtm (last visited July 7, 2012) (disputing report). Among others, Senator
Ted Kennedy was on the list, as well as Nelson Mandela, whose name was only removed by an Act of
Congress. Jon Hilkevitch, New Airport Security Rules to Require More Personal Information, CHI. TRIB.
(Mar. 9, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-03-09/news/0903080245_1_no-fly-listspersonal-data-passengers; Mandela Off U.S. Terrorism Watch List, CNN (July 1, 2008), http://articles.
cnn.com/2008-07-01/world/mandela.watch_1_president-mandela-apartheid-anc?_s=PM:WORLD.
64
See Joe Davidson, Lawmaker Challenges TSA on Claims of Ethnic Profiling, WASH. POST (Nov.
28,
2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/lawmaker-challenges-tsa-on-claims-of-ethnicprofiling/2011/11/28/gIQAtOiO6N_story.html; Bart Jansen, Next Layer of Air Security: Chat-Downs on
Top of Pat-Downs?, USA TODAY (Oct. 14, 2011, 11:53 AM), http://travel.usatoday.com/flights/post/
2011/10/next-layer-of-air-security-chat-downs-on-top-of-pat-downs/553721/1.
65
Michael S. Schmidt & Eric Lichtblau, Racial Profiling Rife at Airport, U.S. Officers Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/us/racial-profiling-at-boston-airportofficials-say.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all; see also infra notes 108–14 and accompanying text.
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walk-straight-onto-the-plane approach, but instead the pre-9/11 status quo66
or some other less intrusive, less expensive arrangement.67 From an
economic perspective, the TSA spent nearly $57 billion on aviation security
in the agency’s first decade.68 During this time, the number of TSA
employees nearly quadrupled and vast sums were paid for new technology,
some of which failed miserably, such as the now-mothballed machines
called “puffers.”69 Don’t forget the consumption of the travelling public’s
66

The pre-9/11 techniques included requiring passengers to pass through a magnetometer, x-raying
their baggage and, if necessary, subjecting them to a sweep by a handheld metal detector or even a light
pat down. See, e.g., United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 1989)
(describing the history and public expectations of standard airport screening, as well as an
unconstitutional expansion of that process).
67
To its credit, the TSA unveiled new software for AIT machines that does not produce detailed
images of an individual passenger’s body. Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA Takes Next Steps to
Further Enhance Passenger Privacy (July 20, 2011), available at http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/
2011/0720.shtm.
The new software automatically detects potential threats and indicates their location on a generic,
computer-generated outline of a person that appears on a monitor attached to the AIT unit. As with
the current version of AIT, if a potential threat is detected, the area will require additional
screening. If no potential threats are detected, an “OK” appears on the monitor with no outline,
and the passenger is cleared.
Id. However, some claim that the new software has a “uniformly high false alarm rate.” Susan Stellin,
Bomb Plot Raises Questions About Airport Security, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2012), http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/05/15/business/plot-raises-questions-about-airport-security.html?pagewanted=all
(quoting Congressman Peter DeFazio) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a change in
software does not address concerns about abusive pat downs, ineffective and racially discriminatory
“chat downs,” or the expansion of TSA checkpoints and searches to other forms of mass transportation.
See, e.g., Brian Bennett, TSA Screenings Aren’t Just for Airports Anymore, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/20/nation/la-na-terror-checkpoints-20111220; Jansen, supra note
64. Ultimately, the constitutional damage may already have been done by judicial acceptance of the
TSA’s post-9/11 regime. See infra notes 96–97, 103–18 and accompanying text.
68
See JOINT MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, A DECADE LATER: A CALL FOR TSA REFORM 3, 7 (Nov. 6,
2011) [hereinafter CALL FOR TSA REFORM], available at http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/
Media/file/112th/Aviation/2011-11-16-TSA_Reform_Report.pdf; see also Garrick Blalock, Vrinda
Kadiyali & Daniel H. Simon, The Impact of Post-9/11 Airport Security Measures on the Demand for Air
Travel, 50 J.L. & ECON. 731, 751 (2007) (noting that total cost for TSA’s first two years of operations
was approximately $11.5 billion).
69
See, e.g., CALL FOR TSA REFORM, supra note 68, at 3, 7; Lauren Fox, TSA Puts Millions of
Dollars of Equipment in Storage House, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 9, 2012), http://www.usnews.
com/news/articles/2012/05/09/tsa-puts-millions-of-dollars-of-equipment-in-storage (internal quotation
marks omitted). The “Explosive Trace Detection Portals” (i.e., puffers) released small puffs of air on
passengers standing in a booth, with the goal of dislodging and then detecting any trace explosive
particles. “From 2004 to 2006, TSA spent more than $30 million to procure and deploy Explosive Trace
Detection Portals,” one congressional report noted. The agency “belatedly discovered the puffers were
unable to detect explosives in an operational environment” and eventually “stored this ineffective
technology for upwards of four years at taxpayer expense prior to disposition in 2009 and 2010.” JOINT
MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, AIRPORT INSECURITY: TSA’S FAILURE TO COST-EFFECTIVELY PROCURE,
DEPLOY AND WAREHOUSE ITS SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES 6 (May 9, 2012) [hereinafter AIRPORT
INSECURITY], available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/5-9-2012-Joint-TSAStaff-Report-FINAL.pdf.
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valuable time—about $9.4 billion in 2004, for instance70—and the loss
associated with people selecting different modes of transportation. The
burden imposed by the TSA’s regime may be sufficient for some travelers
to opt for the roads over short-haul flights, which a trio of Cornell
economists estimated to cost the airline industry over $1 billion in reduced
demand.71
Set against the cost side of the liberty/security ledger is the marginal
utility of the current regime. Several government reviews have expressed
misgivings about the TSA’s expenditures and performance. Apparently, the
agency did little in the way of risk and cost–benefit analyses, exacerbated
by its failure to solicit public input on new technology.72 One congressional
report described the TSA as “an enormous, inflexible and distracted
bureaucracy,” which received performance results that “do not reflect a
good return on this taxpayer investment.”73 Despite the massive influx of
resources and the multiplied presence of security agents, classified test
results showed that performance outcomes “changed very little since the
creation of the TSA.”74
70

See Gregory F. Treverton et al., The Costs of Responding to the Terrorist Threats: The U.S. Case,
in TERRORISM, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND POLITICAL OPENNESS 48, 75–76 (Philip Keefer &
Norman Loayza eds., 2008).
71
See Blalock, Kadiyali & Simon, supra note 68, at 733, 751–53.
72
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOMELAND SECURITY: DHS AND TSA FACE
CHALLENGES OVERSEEING ACQUISITION OF SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES 1 (2012), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590729.pdf (“In recent years, we have reported that DHS has
experienced challenges in managing its multibillion-dollar acquisition efforts, including implementing
technologies that did not meet intended requirements and were not appropriately tested and evaluated,
and has not consistently included completed analyses of costs and benefits before technologies were
implemented.”); infra note 98(noting TSA’s failure to conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking).
73
CALL FOR TSA REFORM, supra note 68, at 2, 3.
74
Id.; see also Grant Stinchfield, TSA Source: Armed Agent Slips Past DFW Body Scanner, NBC 5
DALLAS-FORT WORTH (Feb. 21, 2011, 7:28 PM), http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/TSA-AgentSlips-Through-DFW-Body-Scanner-With-a-Gun-116497568.html. According to government documents
released in 2011, more than 25,000 security breaches had occurred at U.S. airports during the TSA’s
first decade. Of those breaches, “[m]ore than 14,000 were people entering ‘limited-access’ areas by
going through airport doors or passageways without permission, or unauthorized people going from
airport buildings to planes.” Gary Stoller, Airport Security Breaches Since 2001 Raise Alarms, USA
TODAY (July 13, 2011, 12:37 PM), http://travel.usatoday.com/flights/story/2011/07/Airport-securitybreaches-since-2001-raise-alarms/49326312/1. Another 6000 security breaches involved TSA screeners
who failed to screen, or improperly screened, a passenger, his or her carry-on items, or both.
In 2006, tests by the TSA showed that security screeners at Los Angeles International Airport
and Chicago's O'Hare International Airport failed to find fake bombs hidden on undercover agents
posing as passengers in more than 60% of tests, according to a classified report . . . . In 2003, five
undercover Department of Homeland Security agents posing as passengers carried weapons
undetected through several security checkpoints at Boston's Logan International Airport.
Id. In response, a TSA spokesman claimed that the current regime provides “the most stringent level of
checked baggage security in the world,” emphasizing that the number of breaches was a fraction of one
percent of the total number of fliers. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the latter point
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Indeed, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that at
least sixteen known terrorists had traveled on two dozen different occasions
even though the SPOT program was in effect at the relevant airports.75
According to the GAO, it also “remains unclear whether the AIT would
have been able to detect the weapon” used by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
the so-called “Underwear Bomber,” who attempted to detonate explosives
hidden in his underwear while on board a flight from Amsterdam to
Detroit.76 More recently, some experts doubted that TSA technology and
screeners could detect the latest version of an underwear bomb, uncovered
by the CIA and foreign allies.77 The fact is that in the decade since its
creation, the TSA has not caught a single terrorist or foiled a terrorist plot.78
III. AIRPORT SECURITY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The preceding does not take into account the diminution of individual
rights as a result of the TSA regime,79 a real loss but one complicated by
questions of comparability and commensurability.80 For now, it is enough to
demonstrates a welcome appreciation of relative risk, the spokesman’s comments missed the ultimate
issue: whether 25,000 breaches is an improvement over alternative regimes, and if so, whether this
improvement is worth its cost. Cf. id. (quoting chairman of the House Subcommittee on National
Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations as saying, “There’s not much to suggest that
airports are more secure than years ago” (internal quotation mark omitted)).
75
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: TSA IS TAKING STEPS TO
VALIDATE THE SCIENCE UNDERLYING ITS PASSENGER BEHAVIOR DETECTION PROGRAM, BUT EFFORTS
MAY NOT BE COMPREHENSIVE 7–8 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11461t.pdf.
76
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: TSA IS INCREASING
PROCUREMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY, BUT CHALLENGES TO
THIS EFFORT AND OTHER AREAS OF AVIATION SECURITY REMAIN 9 (2010), available at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d10484t.pdf.
Failing to learn from its failed procurement of “puffers,” and in the wake of the Christmas Day
Bomber, TSA rushed to install 500 Advanced Imaging Technology devices, without clear
evidence of effectiveness, at a cost of more than $122 million. Despite lingering passenger health
concerns and uncertainty that AIT would have detected the weapon used in the December 2009
Underwear Bomber incident, TSA planned to increase its deployment of AITs from 878 to 1,800
by the end of FY 2014. GAO has estimated increases in staffing costs alone, due to doubling the
number of AITs that TSA plans to deploy, could add up to $2.4 billion over the expected service
life of the AITs.
AIRPORT INSECURITY, supra note 69, at 6 (footnotes omitted).
77
See, e.g., Josh Margolin, Undie Bomb Is Hide & Eek!, N.Y. POST (May 9, 2012, 3:24 AM), http://
www.nypost.com/p/news/international/undie_bomb_is_hide_eek_Ney39AYuR4i1DXcwcqgWrO.
78
See, e.g., Charles Leocha, TSA Executive Admits Not a Single Terrorist-Related Arrest Has
Resulted From Whole-Body Scanners, TSA NEWS (May 17, 2012), http://tsanewsblog.com/3160/news/
tsa-executive-admits-not-a-single-terrorist-related-arrest-has-resulted-from-whole-body-scanners/.
79
Some are also concerned about the potential health dangers from being exposed to full-body xray scanners. See, e.g., Roni Caryn Rabin, X-Ray Scans at Airports Leave Lingering Worries, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2012, 5:26 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/06/x-ray-scans-at-airportsleave-lingering-worries/.
80
These issues are beyond the limited scope of this Essay. See generally INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997); Virgílio Afonso da Silva,
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say that the regime treats law-abiding citizens as inmates81 and strikes
directly at core constitutional values—basic freedom of bodily autonomy
and privacy, and perhaps equal protection of the law—thereby imposing
genuine costs on the traveling public. The regime’s excesses also
undermine a basic component of the rule of law: freedom from government
caprice and vindictiveness. The “right to defy submissiveness”82 is
infrequently exercised by travelers hoping to avoid the ire of a TSA agent,
who at times appears as the spitting image of the petty tyrant to whom the
Bill of Rights is addressed.83
As a doctrinal matter, the current regime clashes with decent
understandings of the Fourth Amendment. By this, I mean interpretations
that take seriously the presumptive requirements of judicial authorization
and individualized suspicion for government searches and seizures,84 and
therefore do not reduce the constitutional provision to a paper right. As
mentioned in the introduction, Professor Reinert’s piece provides a useful
review of this legal doctrine. In particular, I agree with much of his analysis
regarding three rubrics for evaluating the TSA regime: consent,

Comparing the Incommensurable: Constitutional Principles, Balancing and Rational Decision,
31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 273 (2011); Matthew Adler, Symposium, Law and Incommensurability:
Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998).
81
See, e.g., Harper, supra note 54 (“The search that American travelers undergo at the airport is as
intimate as what prisoners in American jail cells get.”).
82
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
83
See, e.g., Joe Sharkey, In Body Scans, Less Attitude Please, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2010), http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/business/22road.html?_r=1 (describing concerns about authoritarian
behavior of TSA employees). One protesting passenger wrote the words of the Fourth Amendment
across his chest, and when he was subjected to an enhanced secondary screening, he revealed the
constitutional text to TSA agents. It seems the agents did not find this funny; they radioed the police and
had the passenger arrested. In 2011, the passenger’s civil rights suit was dismissed in U.S. district court.
See Tobey v. Napolitano, 808 F. Supp. 2d 830 (E.D. Va. 2011). By contrast, an Oregon state court
acquitted a man charged with indecent exposure after he stripped naked at Portland International
Airport.
The bearded tech consultant was dressed in work pants and slacks when he showed up at PDX for
a flight to San Jose for business . . . . He testified that he refused to go through a full-body scanner
at the security gate, and instead chose to receive a pat down and metal detector screening. After
the pat down, the TSA agents detected the presence of nitrates on his clothes. [The defendant] got
fed up and said he disrobed both in protest and to prove that he wasn't carrying a bomb.
Philip Caulfield, Man Who Stripped Naked at TSA Checkpoint Acquitted, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 19,
2012), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-07-19/news/32751341_1_john-e-brennan-tsa-agents-fullbody-scanner. Relying upon a 1985 appellate decision, the trial judge concluded that the nudity law at
issue did not apply in cases of protest. “It is the speech itself that the state is seeking to punish, and that
it cannot do,” the judge held. Aimee Green, Portland's Airport Stripper John Brennan Convinces Judge
Nudity Was Protest Against TSA, THE OREGONIAN (July 18, 2012, 7:22 PM), http://www.oregonlive.
com/portland/index.ssf/2012/07/portlands_airport_stripper_joh.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
84
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493, 499 (1958).
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reasonableness balancing, and “special needs.” Any number of points might
be added to the mix, but here are just a few thoughts for further discussion:
Today, commercial air travel is ubiquitous in the United States, with
over 600 million passengers taking more than 9 million flights each
year.85 Flying by plane is not merely a luxury, and it certainly is not
some type of government privilege. Instead, commercial flight is a
major vehicle of business, and at times it is a necessity of modern
life.86 Without returning to the idea of Constitution-free zones or
adopting a conception of the Fourth Amendment sealed in pretwentieth-century amber, a passenger cannot be said to shed his rights
simply by choosing to travel by plane.87
 The notion that a passenger implicitly consents to any TSA search by
entering the security queue is no truer than the idea that someone
implicitly consents to government eavesdropping by using a cell
phone, for example, or that people implicitly consent to the
rummaging of their cars and the contents simply by getting behind the
wheel.88 The scope of consent obviously matters a great deal in the
analysis. It is one thing to x-ray a handbag or backpack, a routine
process in various contexts beyond airport security (e.g., entering a
courthouse). But it is quite another matter to create images of a
passenger’s nude body, which would seem to be the kind of intrusive
search that requires individualized suspicion and possibly judicial
approval.89 In considering this issue, public knowledge of the TSA
program and any conditioning of the traveler’s expectations should be
largely irrelevant. To hold otherwise would mean that the government
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TranStats, RITA, http://www.transtats.bts.gov (last visited July 7, 2012).
See, e.g., Charisse Jones, Sour Economy Gives Rise to Extreme Commuters, USA TODAY, (Aug.
16, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://travel.usatoday.com/news/story/2012-08-16/Sour-economy-gives-rise-toextreme-commuters/57099694/1.
87
Cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52 (rejecting the notion of “constitutionally protected area[s]” as a
talismanic solution to Fourth Amendment issues, noting that the defendant did not “shed his right to
[exclude the uninvited ear] simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen,” and
holding that a narrower interpretation would “ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to
play in private communication” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
88
Cf. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806–07 (2d Cir. 1974) (“To make one choose
between flying to one’s destination and exercising one’s constitutional right [to waive consent] appears
to us . . . in many situations a form of coercion, however subtle.”); id. at 807 n.14 (“[I]f the government
were to announce that hereafter all telephones would be tapped, perhaps to counter an outbreak of
political kidnapings, it would not justify, even after public knowledge of the wiretapping plan, the
proposition that anyone using a telephone consented to being tapped.”); United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d
884, 886 (8th Cir. 1973) (“Compelling the defendant to choose between exercising Fourth Amendment
rights and his right to travel constitutes coercion; the government cannot be said to have established that
the defendant freely and voluntarily consent to the search when to do otherwise would have meant
foregoing the constitutional right to travel.”).
89
See Reinert, supra note 10, at 223–224.
86
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could bolster the case for upholding a search regime by simply
announcing it to the public.90
 In theory, airport security measures might be checked by the type of
balancing approach adopted in Terry v. Ohio91 or by the special needs
doctrine that Terry helped inspire. But in practice, the all-thingsconsidered weighing process seems to begin with a heavy thumb on
the government side of the scale. As detailed elsewhere, the constant
pressure of law enforcement has mostly eviscerated whatever
safeguards Terry might have provided. Today, it stands for the
proposition that officers may stop any person at any time, based on
legally valid but often trifling offenses, for which the unspoken goal is
uncovering contraband.92 For its part, the special needs test is so
malleable it nearly licenses a judicial adhocracy, as seen in the
hodgepodge of court decisions pointing in various directions.93 To this
day, an obscure line distinguishes the “special needs” of law
enforcement from those needs that are merely “normal.” It also
remains curious (to me, at least) that a state actor’s inability to meet
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment provides an argument in
favor of dispensing with those requirements.94
With these and other considerations in mind, Professor Reinert is spoton when he says that the TSA’s new regime is “difficult to square with
fundamental Fourth Amendment principles.”95 He is also correct that the
courts will feel obliged to uphold the regime—maybe out of deference to
the post-9/11 Executive Branch or simply to avoid the appearance of
impeding antiterrorism efforts—regrettably, distorting search and seizure
doctrine along the way. In its 2011 decision in Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC) v. Department of Homeland Security, the D.C.
Circuit held that the use of AIT scanners did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.96 The court characterized passenger screening as an
90

See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979).
392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968).
92
Erik Luna, Hydraulic Pressures and Slight Deviations, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 133, 140; see
also Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 2, Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 01034 (SAS)
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2010), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Expert_Report_JeffreyFagan.pdf
(finding that the New York City Police Department employs Terry stops in a racially discriminatory
manner).
93
See, e.g., Erik Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 876–88 (1999); cf. Skinner v.
Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 639 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the special
needs doctrine turns search and seizure law into a “patchwork quilt”).
94
See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
724–25 (1987).
95
Reinert, supra note 10, at 209.
96
Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Several
challenges to the use of AIT scanners (as well as aggressive pat downs) have been dismissed pursuant to
91
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administrative search, which only requires that the governmental interest in
safety outweigh the passenger’s interest in privacy. “That balance clearly
favors the Government here,” the panel concluded, noting that the AIT
scanners can detect nonmetallic explosives, the images produced are
“distort[ed]” and immediately deleted, and passengers may choose to be
frisked instead.97 The opinion’s terse analysis of a highly contentious issue
in a high-profile case speaks volumes about the level of deference that the
TSA will receive from the courts.98
As such, Professor Reinert’s instinct—preventing gratuitous damage to
the Fourth Amendment—is laudable. Moreover, his proposed doctrinal
limitation is quite attractive, calling for the suppression of evidence found
during special needs searches in ensuing prosecutions unrelated to the
special need itself.99 For instance, a bag of marijuana uncovered during the
TSA screening process would be excluded from a subsequent drug case.
Actually, I would prefer to apply this doctrinal move more generally as a
(partial) solution to the most problematic forms of pretextual investigations,
such as exploiting minor infractions (e.g., most traffic stops) to detain
people and search for more serious but unrelated offenses (e.g., scouring a
vehicle to find illegal drugs).
Unfortunately, these types of proposals face significant hurdles in
existing case law.100 Professor Reinert notes that the Supreme Court has not
decided the question of “whether an administrative search regime that
routinely generated evidence for prosecution could be upheld under ‘special
needs.’”101 A negative answer might force some courts to invoke other
doctrines, including those supposedly more disruptive of search and seizure
law (i.e., consent and reasonableness balancing). This is not just idle
speculation. Far from broadening the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
49 U.S.C. § 46110 (2006), which provides federal appellate courts exclusive jurisdiction to review TSA
orders. See Corbett v. United States, 458 F. App’x 866, 869–71 (11th Cir. 2012); Roberts v. Napolitano,
798 F. Supp. 2d 7, 10–11 (D.D.C. 2011).
97
Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
98
Because the court found that “the TSA has advanced no justification for having failed to conduct
a notice-and-comment rulemaking,” it remanded the matter to the TSA with the expectation that the
agency would act “promptly” to address the defect in rule promulgation. Id. at 8. Apparently, the TSA
still has not begun the rulemaking process, leading the plaintiffs to petition the D.C. Circuit for a writ of
mandamus. See In re Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., No. 12-1307 (Aug., 1 2012) (ordering government to
respond to plaintiffs’ petition).
99
See Reinert, supra note 10, at 220–25.
100
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–12 (1996) (refusing to invalidate a traffic
stop as a pretextual investigation); United States v. McCarty, 648 F.3d 820, 830–31 (9th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The mere fact that a screening procedure
ultimately reveals contraband other than weapons or explosives does not render it unreasonable, post
facto.”); 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 10.6(h) 5 (4th ed. 2004).
101
Reinert, supra note 10, at 228 n.109.
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the Roberts Court has chipped away at the rule with the apparent goal of
eliminating it altogether.102
Given post-9/11 terrorism anxieties, it is unsurprising that antiexclusionary rule sentiments are particularly powerful in the context of
airport security. For example, two recent appellate court decisions—one
federal (United States v. McCarty) and the other state (Higerd v. State)—
upheld TSA searches that uncovered evidence of child pornography in
checked baggage.103 In each case, agents opened the baggage and removed a
folder containing documents, which they then inspected, supposedly
looking for thin, flat charges known as “sheet explosives.” Photographs
found in the respective folders served as the basis for subsequent criminal
prosecutions. Both appellate decisions agreed that the agents had conducted
an administrative search that requires neither a warrant nor individualized
suspicion, because it was “no more extensive nor intensive than necessary,
in the light of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or
explosives” and was “confined in good faith to that purpose.”104
The Ninth Circuit’s McCarty decision has troubles on several fronts.
The appellate panel undertook a very un-appellate-like parsing of the
record, scrutinizing the district court’s assessments of witness credibility,
not affording deference to a trial judge’s factual findings, and even (lightly)
reprimanding the lower court colleague.105 More importantly, the decision
allows TSA agents to search any and all items in passenger baggage based
on the sweeping claim that explosives “may be disguised as a simple piece
of paper or cardboard, and may be hidden in just about anything, including
a laptop, book, magazine, deck of cards, or packet of photographs.”106
Worse yet, evidence of an agent’s ulterior motive—for instance, searching a
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See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–29 (2011); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 139–48 (2009); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590–94 (2006). But see United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (affirming reversal of conviction due to Fourth Amendment protection of
property, not privacy).
103
See McCarty, 648 F.3d at 823–24; Higerd v. State, 54 So. 3d 513, 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
104
McCarty, 648 F.3d at 831 (quoting United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007) (en
banc) (internal quotation mark omitted)); accord Higerd, 54 So. 3d at 517.
105
See McCarty, 648 F.3d at 832–38.
106
Id. at 825; see also United States v. Rosales, No. 10-CR-0339 (PJS/JJK), 2011 WL 6004026, at
*1–2 (D. Minn. Nov. 30, 2011) (upholding search of envelope). But see, e.g., United States v. Fulgham,
No. C 12-124 CW, 2012 WL 2598546 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2012) (granting suppression motion). As an
aside, several TSA employees have been caught stealing money and property from luggage, with one
supervisor receiving kickbacks from his subordinate’s crimes. Logan Burruss, TSA Officers Arrested
After Allegedly Stealing $40,000, CNN (Feb. 17, 2011, 3:46 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/
02/16/new.york.tsa.arrests; Newark TSA Officer Pleads Guilty to Theft from Passengers, REUTERS (Feb.
14,
2011,
5:27
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/14/us-airport-bribes-idUSTRE
71D72V20110214; TSA Agents Arrested in Case of Missing Cash at Airport, REUTERS (Feb. 16, 2011,
7:38 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/17/us-airport-theft-idUSTRE71G08I20110217.
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bag for contraband unrelated to terrorist threats—may be disregarded so
long as the TSA’s “programmatic motive” is airline safety.107
Unscrutinized discretion in government enforcement can be susceptible
to racial and ethnic prejudice, as has been the case with pretextual stops on
the streets and highways (and at airports, too).108 In August 2012, the New
York Times reported that TSA agents at Boston’s Logan International
Airport were targeting travelers on the basis of race or ethnicity, apparently
believing that minorities were more likely to possess illegal drugs, to have
outstanding warrants for their arrest, or to be in violation of immigration
laws. Several agents claimed that the stops were viewed as a means to pad
the statistics, showing policymakers the SPOT program was effective.109
[P]assengers who fit certain profiles—Hispanics traveling to Miami, for
instance, or blacks wearing baseball caps backward—are much more likely to
be stopped, searched and questioned for “suspicious” behavior. “They just pull
aside anyone who they don’t like the way they look—if they are black and
have expensive clothes or jewelry, or if they are Hispanic,” said one white
officer, who [spoke] on the condition of anonymity.110

The allegations mirror those of minority motorists and pedestrians who
long claimed to be victims of racial profiling, a phenomenon that was
eventually acknowledged and condemned by the political class.111 After the
Times article ran, the TSA also criticized racial profiling as ineffective and
intolerable, announcing that an internal investigation was underway and
ordering special training for all agents in Boston and managers elsewhere.112
In time, a fair and full inquiry may prove the accusations to be unfounded.
Or maybe the TSA’s “refresher course” will do the trick, reinforcing the
agency’s professed intolerance for racial profiling by its employees.113
Regardless, the story serves as a reminder of the potential problems of
enforcement discretion without meaningful oversight, such as government
agents who can detain and search an individual “whenever they do not like
the cut of his jib.”114
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See McCarty, 648 F.3d at 832.
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CONCLUSION
In July 2012, a federal trial judge provided a bit of good news for those
concerned that the war on terror has become an all-purpose excuse for
government intrusions. After TSA agents identified a suspicious object in a
checked bag, a law enforcement officer examined a DVD player that
contained tiny cylindrical items. “From my training and experience, I
recognized that the solid mass was not an explosive but possibly some type
of contraband being concealed,” the officer wrote in a contemporaneous
report.115 The DVD player was then cracked open, revealing pills that were
subsequently determined to be the illegal drug Ecstasy. At a suppression
hearing two years later, the officer contradicted his incident report and
claimed that at the time of the search he had not ruled out the possibility
that the pills could be a threat to airline safety. This was too much for the
trial judge. If the officer believed the mass was an explosive, “he would not
have said otherwise in his report,” the judge wrote in excluding evidence
from trial.116 The officer’s assertions at the suppression hearing were
especially implausible given that “he opened up the DVD player without
taking any safety precautions or utilizing the bomb-sniffing dog that he
testified was at the screening area.”117
Unfortunately, this ruling is likely to stand as an outlier, with cases
such as EPIC and McCarty foreshadowing judicial acquiescence to the
entire TSA search regime and all the figurative baggage it carries, so long
as agents do not reveal their actual motives. Along these lines, the state
court decision in Higerd may be the most telling. After accepting the
predictable arguments in favor of the search in question, the court offered
an alternative rationale to deny the suppression motion: The damning
evidence was admissible pursuant to the “good faith exception” to the
warrant requirement based on the assumption that a reasonably well-trained
TSA agent would not have known the search was illegal.118 This claim fits
uncomfortably with the refusal to inquire into an agent’s actual motives for
conducting a search, but it does demonstrate a readiness to find
constitutional exceptions for post-9/11 airport security and, more generally,
antiterrorism measures designed to prevent another attack.
In the end, I would prefer some honesty. What is at play here is not
good faith or some other recognized exception, such as consent or special
needs. The otherwise applicable legal requirements are set aside, not
pursuant to a reasoned assessment of the risks, costs, and benefits, but due
115

United States v. Fulgham, No. C 12-124 CW, 2012 WL 2598546, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Higerd v. State, 54 So. 3d 513, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135 (2009)).
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to an abiding fear of al Qaeda and its now-deceased kingpin. Let’s call it
what it is: the Bin Laden Exception to the Fourth Amendment. Perhaps
putting a name on a legal dodge might inspire second thoughts about the
developing doctrine and, more generally, the wisdom of spending vast sums
and disregarding basic principles for the sake of one bad man and his
outlaw organization.
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